Container movement clarity is breeding mastery for Biosecurity New Zealand

Andrew Spelman, Commissioner, Intelligence and Systems, Biosecurity New Zealand answers questions about tracking and monitoring the complete journey of a container.

Was implementing 100% container checks a result of the Strengthening Cargo: Review of the Sea Cargo Pathway report?

Biosecurity New Zealand was already working towards improving container reporting before the review (which can be read in full at https://shorturl.at/wICow). However, the review recommended expanding this work to introduce full reporting. Previously, inspections at transitional facilities (TFs) followed an exception model, where only contamination detections had to be reported. Under 100% reporting, all inspections at TFs must be reported, whether contamination is detected or not.

The change allowed Biosecurity New Zealand to track all container movements, providing a much clearer picture of biosecurity risks from imported cargo.

Is this initiative and the 100% sea container checks for transitional facilities (mandatory from 2021) the same? Both of which are being undertaken through the Container Check Portal (CCP)?

Yes, they are the same initiative.

How long did it take to develop, test, and implement the Container Check Portal (CCP)? Who was involved?

The project was completed over six months, from February to July 2021. During this time, Biosecurity New Zealand worked closely with ports, TFs, and other biosecurity partners to ensure a smooth rollout. An awareness campaign ran through March and April. Training materials were then developed with our training and assessment partners for TF operators and accredited persons (APs), who are employed by industry to carry out biosecurity inspections at TFs.

Can you provide any high-level feedback following its rollout: was it well received?

There was positive feedback about strengthening the AP role and the benefits of capturing more information. Some facilities and APs suggested improving the online guides to make them clearer. TF operators also requested their own access to check AP records, and some larger facilities wanted business-to-business connections for direct data entry into our systems.

Due to the unique operations of some ports, additional support was needed in certain cases. Biosecurity New Zealand monitored the rollout, offering help to facilities to ensure uptake and resolve any issues. A reference group of external stakeholders was set up to ensure industry needs were well understood.

Why wasn’t all data like this collected before this rollout?

Before 2004, physical records of sea container inspections were kept onsite and faxed to Biosecurity New Zealand for centralised reporting. As submission volumes grew, this became unmanageable, leading to the introduction of exception reporting, where only contamination cases were recorded. While this streamlined processes, it left gaps in container movement visibility. The CCP was introduced to reduce manual data entry for reporting.

How has collecting this data improved MPI’s container traceability? What are these import measures and examples of supporting post-border surveillance activities?

Full reporting has significantly improved Biosecurity New Zealand’s ability to track container movements, identify biosecurity risks, and inform regulatory and surveillance decisions.

Container inspection reporting informs New Zealand’s import rules for managing the biosecurity risk of sea containers. It also helps Biosecurity New Zealand deploy resources to confirm compliance when risk profiles change for our trading partners – for example, if we identify that a country has a newly established pest. Additionally, the data is used in international forums to support the development of multinational import conditions or rules, ensuring they are risk-based, feasible, and practical.

CCP is described as an interim solution while the “replacement of MPI’s Border Information and Communication Technology (ICT) system [is] still 18-24 months away.” What does that mean for the new improvements made to CCP in March 2024 and/or MPI’s ICT system? What is your endgame if this is a Minimum Viable Product?

The switch to 100% container reporting in July 2021 involved minimal IT system changes. This was the “Minimum Viable Product”.

Between December 2021 and March 2024, we replaced our cargo management system with new technology. As part of this, the CCP was completely rebuilt and went live in March last year. It offers the same functionality but is now more user-friendly and has improved security.

The goal was to improve what we could from the legacy system, but the change was essentially a like-for-like replacement.

Future CCP improvements include business-to-business connections for direct data submission, especially useful for large facilities. We aim to have this running within the next few months.

We are also working on providing TF operators with direct access to CCP, giving them visibility over all containers at their TF. This will include new functions like checking consignment status.

Since those changes to CCP were rolled out nearly 12 months ago, has data collection improved? If so, how is MPI utilising this data? Can you give an example (e.g., how many containers are being reported through this portal)?

Data collection rates have significantly improved. Nearly 90% of container inspections at TFs were reported through CCP in 2023 and 2024. The remaining inspections, i.e., those not reported through CCP, are from large facilities with their own reporting systems. These systems are reviewed by Biosecurity New Zealand during regular performance assessments or on request.

How many educational letters, corrective action reports, or infringement notices have been issued due to unauthorised container movement or reporting failure in the past 12 months?

We identified 35 unauthorised container movements in the year ending January 2025. Of these, 13 resulted in education letters, 12 in infringements, and four in directives to take corrective action. The remaining cases were due to data input errors or other factors.

What feedback have TFs and/or APs provided to ensure quality-of-life improvements are implemented?

As mentioned earlier, the most common requests from TF operators and APs are for CCP to have business-to-business connectivity to reduce double handling of data. This is a priority for Biosecurity New Zealand, along with giving operators direct access to CCP for full oversight of all containers being devanned at their TF.

How has MPI helped improve voluntary compliance with its reporting requirements?

Biosecurity New Zealand had worked closely with industry groups, including through the Biosecurity Business Pledge, to encourage voluntary compliance. Businesses involved in initiatives like the pledge tend to have higher compliance rates and a greater understanding of their crucial role in protecting New Zealand from biosecurity risks.